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INTERACTION OF FUNDAMENTAL (HUMAN) RIGHTS 
AND FUNDAMENTAL (MARKET) FREEDOMS IN THE EU
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Summary: The issue of balancing free trade with the protection of val-
ues, national regulatory autonomy and sovereignty has recently been 
accentuated in the area of fundamental (human) rights. It is well es-
tablished case law that fundamental rights are a part of the general 
principles of Community law protected by the Court, but their precise 
status in the EU legal order has remained unclear up to the present. 
Particularly questionable is the issue of the hierarchy of these rights 
in relation to Treaty provisions. This paper focuses on the interaction 
between fundamental rights and fundamental (market) freedoms, and 
it analyses the implications of the case law dealing, on the one hand, 
with their mutual enhancement and, on the other hand, with their po-
tential confl icts. Both types of cases raise sensitive constitutional is-
sues, because, while supporting fundamental rights protection, there 
is an occasional lack of concern for other interests that national regu-
lators seek to protect.
I. Introduction
The issue of balancing free trade with the protection of values, na-
tional regulatory autonomy and sovereignty has recently been accentu-
ated in the area of fundamental (human) rights.1 It is well established 
case law that fundamental rights are a part of the general principles of 
Community law protected by the Court, 2 but their precise status in the 
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SJD Colloquium of the University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, and at the 6th Bien-
nial Conference of ECSA-C, Victoria, B.C. Canada.
1 Hereinafter, fundamental rights or human rights.
2 The system of fundamental rights protection was absent from the original treaties, and 
it was developed later on, primarily by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but also by 
the Community’s “legislative” institutions and through treaty amendments. The reasons 
which led to this kind of jurisprudence were abundant and multifarious. In my opinion, 
this development was a necessary corollary of introducing direct effect and supremacy in 
1963 and 1964, as there is no doubt that Member States would have found these charac-
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EU legal order has remained unclear up to the present. Particularly ques-
tionable is the issue of the hierarchy of these rights in relation to Treaty 
provisions. In the context of the internal market, this issue is relevant 
because fundamental (market) freedoms3 and human rights can interact 
in many ways. The type of interaction that has recently caused great 
stir concerns the question of whether fundamental rights protection is a 
permissible exception to fundamental freedoms, and, if this is so, under 
what conditions.4 Or is it perhaps vice versa, since fundamental freedoms 
can only operate within the framework of and in accordance with fun-
damental rights. Consequently, is fundamental rights protection in this 
case a derogation from Community law or its implementation?5 
In answering these questions “[i]t is signifi cant ... that the Court of 
Justice should defend fundamental rights as general legal principles of 
the Community on the basis of Article 220 EC and Article 6(2) EU. They 
are to be considered part of its primary legislation and therefore rank in 
hierarchy at the same level as other primary legislation, particularly fun-
damental freedoms.”6 “It would nevertheless be appropriate to discuss in 
general the question of whether ... fundamental and human rights could 
in general be afforded a certain precedence over ‘general’ primary legisla-
tion”.7 
These issues are further complicated by the fact that “fundamental 
freedoms themselves can also perfectly well be materially categorised as 
fundamental rights - at least in certain respects: in so far as they lay 
teristics of Community law unacceptable if the Community had not committed itself to the 
observance of fundamental rights which lie at the core of national legal orders. (Case 26/62 
NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1, case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 
585.) One could also speculate on the Court’s ulterior motives - resisting pressures from 
Member States, extending its own jurisdiction, subjecting States to its scrutiny of funda-
mental rights protection, rivalry with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), etc., 
but the intent of this paper is to focus on specifi c questions arising from the fundamental 
rights’ case law, and not to give a complete overview of ECJ’s jurisprudence in this area or 
to provide a thorough analysis of the motives, controversies and pitfalls surrounding it.
3 Hereinafter, fundamental freedoms or market freedoms.
4 On the relationship between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, see S Weath-
erill, ‘The Internal Market’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004), NN Shuibhne, ‘The Euro-
pean Union and Fundamental Freedoms’ in P Beaumont, C Lyons and N Walker (eds), Con-
vergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002).
5 See J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights and Common Market Freedoms in Union 
Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the European Constitution’, (2006) 12 (1) 
European Law Journal 15, 31-33.
6 Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Auto-
matenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609, 
delivered on 18 March 2004, para 49
7 ibid para 50.
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down prohibitions on discrimination, for example, they are to be consid-
ered a specifi c means of expression of the general principle of equality 
before the law. In this respect, a confl ict between fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the Treaty and fundamental and human rights can also, at 
least in many cases, represent a confl ict between fundamental rights.”8 
The question whether fundamental market freedoms have the status of 
fundamental rights has been highly controversial in legal scholarship,9 
but even if there was a clear answer to it, it would still be unclear how to 
balance these market freedoms with (other) fundamental rights.10 This is 
fi rstly because fundamental rights are not absolute, so they can also be 
restricted under certain conditions, and secondly because not all funda-
mental rights enjoy the same status.11
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights12 has not shed much light on 
this area, and this is fi rstly due to the fact that the status of this docu-
ment has remained uncertain ever since its solemn proclamation in 2000, 
and, secondly, because the issue is not explicitly addressed therein.13 
The Charter has been incorporated into the signed Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe,14 so the fundamental rights which it guarantees 
could be reaffi rmed as a part of primary EU law if the Constitution comes 
into force (which currently does not seem likely). However, even this de-
velopment would not answer the question whether fundamental rights 
are hierarchically superior to fundamental freedoms.
8 ibid.
9 This was particularly controversial in WTO law. See EU Petersmann, ‘Time for a United 
Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organi-
zations: Lessons from European Integration’ (2002) 13 EJIL (2002) 621, R Howse, ‘Human 
Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann’ (2002) 13 
EJIL 651, P Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A 
Reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13 EJIL 815, EU Petersmann, ‘Taking Human Dignity, Poverty 
and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston’ (2002) 13 EJIL 845.
10 For an analysis of tensions between trade and human rights in the global context and 
their possible solutions, see C McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of 
Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of ‘Selective Purchasing’ Laws 
under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) JIEL 2, 3, C McCrudden and 
A Davies, ‘A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights’ (2000) JIEL 3, 43.
11 It is noteworthy that art 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Un-
ion (OJ C 364/1, 18 December 2000) guarantees the freedom to conduct a business. The 
Explanatory Memorandum states that this provision is based on the ECJ’s earlier case 
law, but it remains uncertain whether it can be interpreted to cover fundamental market 
freedoms. Council of the European Union, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union - Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter’ <http://ue.eu.int/doc-
Center.asp?lang=en&cmsid=245> accessed December 2000.
12 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1.
13 So far, the ECJ has never called upon the Charter, but it has frequently been relied upon 
by Advocates General.
14 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310.
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Similarly, case law does not provide a clear-cut answer to weighing 
market freedoms with national, international and Community standards 
of human rights protection (or on the weighing of all these interests with 
other regulatory preferences). Moreover, it will be shown that the out-
come depends on the circumstances of a particular case. It is noteworthy 
that this is the fi eld of EC law where the case law concerning each of the 
four fundamental freedoms is relevant for all of them, i.e. where the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) is applying its reasoning throughout the four 
freedoms. Therefore, this paper will touch upon all the freedoms. Until 
recently, the cases that reached the ECJ dealt only with situations where 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms reinforced one another, or 
at least where their confl ict was not explicit (these cases will be addressed 
in part II of this paper). In contrast, since the year 2000 there have been 
several cases where full observance of market freedoms has collided with 
fundamental rights protection (the cases will be dealt with in part III).
II. Mutually enhancing (or at least not directly confl icting) 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms 
Preliminary remarks
One might generally argue that the development of market freedoms 
and of fundamental rights go hand in hand, but it is not the intention of 
this paper to analyse the general conditions for the functioning of mar-
kets or for the creation of human rights protection mechanisms. What is 
important here is that the Court has established a system of signifi cant 
fundamental rights protection by linking these rights to another Commu-
nity law issue, frequently to a fundamental freedom. This chapter will fo-
cus on particular cases where a fundamental freedom and a fundamental 
right have worked to each other’s advantage (as in ERT,15 Carpenter16 and 
Karner17), although in some instances the situation was additionally com-
plicated by the very number of fundamental rights at issue (e.g. in SPUC 
v. Grogan18 and Familiapress19). I will argue that there can be many posi-
tive synergies between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, 
15 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 
Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and 
others [1991] ECR I-2925.
16 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
6279.
17 Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GesmbH [2004] 
ECR I-3025.
18 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd and Stephen 
Grogan and Others [1991] ECR I-4685.
19 Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich 
Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689.
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but that, in deciding on their preferable scope, consideration should paid 
to many other values at stake. Namely, positive synergy is not necessar-
ily one that maximises the protection of fundamental rights and funda-
mental freedoms, but is something that protects them, at the same time 
leaving enough space for the protection of other legitimate interests. This 
will be further explained in the case law analysis below.
Case law analysis
Laying out the standard ERT line of case law
The interplay between fundamental freedoms and fundamental 
rights in the ERT line of case law is based on the idea that the scope of 
fundamental freedoms and their possible exceptions should be construed 
in the light of fundamental rights. This approach was already argued for 
by Advocate General Slynn in Cinéthèque,20 and the Court adopted it in 
ERT. ERT concerned a Greek law granting a television monopoly to a sin-
gle broadcaster, and the question was whether this Greek law was con-
trary to the freedom to provide services and whether this freedom had to 
be appraised in the light of the freedom of expression embodied in Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).21 The Court 
took a very important step in respect of the coherence between market 
freedoms and human rights. It established that all national rules within 
the scope of Community law, particularly the justifi cations of State “rules 
which are likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide serv-
ices ... must be interpreted in the light of general principles of law and in 
particular of fundamental rights”.22 The scope of the freedom to provide 
services and of its possible exceptions, such as public policy, public se-
curity and public health, had to be interpreted in the light of the freedom 
of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR.23 
The Court’s approach in ERT did not go without criticism. A common 
objection was that fundamental rights were being used to enhance mar-
ket integration since they limited the possibility of justifying restrictions 
to fundamental market freedoms. The Court itself was aware of this, so 
in the following case, SPUC v. Grogan, it showed caution in extending a 
fundamental rights review. The case arose in Ireland where abortion is 
prohibited and where Grogan and several other offi cers of student asso-
20 Opinion of AG Slynn in 60/61-84 Cinéthèque SA and others v Fédération nationale des 
cinémas français [1985] ECR 2605, delivered on 20 March 1985.
21 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), ETS no 5
22 ERT (n 15) para 43.
23 For a more recent example of the interface between free movement of goods and freedom 
of expression, see Opinion of Advocate General Alber in Karner (n 17).
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ciations were distributing information about abortion clinics in the UK. 
SPUC (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) requested a na-
tional court to declare that the distribution of the mentioned material 
was illegal and it sought an injunction to restrain further distribution.24 
The national court was not certain whether such a decision would be in 
conformity with Community law, so it made a preliminary reference. The 
ECJ primarily found that a “medical termination of pregnancy, performed 
in accordance with the law of the State in which it was carried out” con-
stituted a service within the meaning of the EC Treaty. A more subtle 
question was whether a prohibition on the provision of information about 
abortion clinics was contrary to Community law in respect, fi rstly, of the 
freedom to provide services and, secondly, the freedom of expression and 
the freedom to impart and receive information. Concerning the freedom 
to provide services, the ECJ said there was no economic link between the 
student associations and the service providers in the UK, resulting in the 
matter not being within the scope of the EC Treaty.25 The lack of an eco-
nomic link was a crucial difference between the facts of SPUC v. Grogan 
and ERT, and this difference was further refl ected in the ECJ’s scrutiny 
over fundamental rights. The Court held that unlike the situation in ERT, 
“with regard to national legislation lying outside the scope of Community 
law” “the Court has no such jurisdiction” to “provide the national court 
with all the elements of interpretation which are necessary in order to en-
able it to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental 
rights”.26
Another case that elaborated ERT was Familiapress. It extended 
the ERT reasoning by making clear that measures adopted to achieve a 
“mandatory requirement” also had to be assessed in the light of general 
principles of law and in particular of fundamental rights. The case dealt 
with an Austrian law containing a prohibition of offering consumers free 
gifts connected with the sale of goods or the provision of services, and it 
did not allow any exceptions for the press. A German publisher, Hein-
rich Bauer Verlag, was publishing a magazine “Laura”, which contained 
a crossword puzzle and readers who sent correct solutions could win 
valuable prizes. “Laura” was sold in Austria, so an Austrian newspaper 
publisher, Familiapress, brought an action against Heinrich Bauer Ver-
lag on the basis of Austrian law. The question that reached the ECJ was 
whether this law was compatible with Article 28 EC. The Court rejected 
the Austrian arguments that the law concerned selling arrangements and 
held that, since the law required traders from other Member States to 
24 SPUC v Grogan (n 18) para 7.
25 ibid paras 25-27.
26 ibid para 31.
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alter the contents of the periodical, it impaired their market access and 
constituted a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restric-
tions (Article 28 EC). 
The interplay between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms 
again appeared in the assessment of justifi cation, since the Austrian gov-
ernment invoked the mandatory requirement of maintaining press diver-
sity.27 It was emphasised that the situation in Austria was specifi c due to 
an unusually high degree of concentration of the press,28 and that the law 
was adopted to prevent competition in which publishers offered larger 
and larger gifts which could, consequently, eliminate small publishers.29 
One should notice that the question whether the Austrian law could be 
justifi ed on grounds of press diversity was ambiguous in respect of funda-
mental rights protection. On the one hand, the law was enhancing press 
diversity as a means of facilitating the freedom of expression, protected 
by Article 10 ECHR. In this respect, Familiapress could be considered 
as the fi rst case where fundamental rights were grounds for justifying 
a restriction of the free movement of goods, albeit indirectly (in contrast 
to Schmidberger30 and Omega31 where a fundamental right was directly 
invoked to justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom).32 On the other 
hand, the law limited publishers, such as Heinrich Bauer Verlag, who 
wanted to offer free gifts to their consumers, in their freedom of expres-
sion, particularly in the right to commercial speech.
It is important that the ECJ assessed the scope of the suggested 
justifi cation in the light of the ECHR and of the practice of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It established that according to 
the practice of the ECtHR, the Convention permits derogations from the 
freedom of expression for the purposes of preserving press diversity, in 
so far as they are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.33 Finally, the Court provided the national court with guidelines to as-
27 Familiapress (n 19) para 13.
28 ibid para 17.
29 ibid paras 14-16.
30 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge and Repu-
blik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659.
31 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeiste-
rin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
32 MP Maduro, ‘The Saga of Article 30 EC Treaty: To Be Continued - A Comment on Famili-
apress v. Bauer Verlag and Other Recent Episodes’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of Euro-
pean and Comparative Law 311.
33 Familiapress (n 19) para 26. The ECJ explicitly relied on the decision of the ECtHR 
in Lentia (Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria (App no 13914/88, 15041/89, 
15717/89, 15779/89, 17207/90) (1993) Series A no 276, and Advocate General Tesauro 
(Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Familiapress (n 19), delivered on 13 March 1997) 
also called upon several other cases explaining permissible restrictions to freedom of ex-
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sess whether the law was proportionate “to the aim of maintaining press 
diversity and whether that objective might not be attained by measures 
less restrictive to both intra-Community trade and the freedom of expres-
sion”.34
Pros and cons of the ERT line of case law
The Court’s approach in ERT was criticised on the grounds that it 
was using fundamental rights for the enhancement of market integration 
by limiting the possibility of justifying restrictions to fundamental market 
freedoms. 
However, I tend to agree with Weatherill who notices that the case 
law, particularly SPUC v. Grogan, demonstrates that the Court “is alert to 
the dangers of ‘over-marketising’ policy sectors” and that “it was willing 
in cases it deems appropriate to fi nd reasons to treat national choices as 
falling outwith the scope of application of the relevant Treaty provisions 
altogether. The reach of trade law tends to spill over into ever wider sec-
tors. The Court is not oblivious to the dangers this presents.”35 The ECJ’s 
reasoning in SPUC v. Grogan illustrates its awareness of the subtleties in 
balancing all the values concerned, such as the freedom to impart and 
receive information, the freedom of expression, the right to life and the 
right to privacy, as well as the implication of this question on the free 
movement of services. The ECJ considered that the case was so remotely 
connected to the provision of services that the balancing of the values at 
stake was to be left to national regulators. One can only speculate how 
the Court would have decided the case if medical clinics from the UK, i.e. 
the foreign service providers themselves, were the ones distributing the 
information in Ireland. 
The Court’s reluctance to engage in the assessment of the Irish regu-
latory choice becomes even more visible in the light of the fact that its de-
cision did not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. Namely, unlike 
the Court, Advocate General Van Gerven considered that “Community 
citizens derive from [the Treaty provision of free movement of services] the 
pression (The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom(App no 6538/74) (1979) Series A no 30; 
Lingens v Austria (App no 9815/82) (1986) Series A no 103 etc.). The approach of the Court 
where it wants to give fundamental rights in the Community the same meaning and scope 
as the ECtHR is particularly relevant in respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU which provides that “[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention” (art 52). The Court’s practice of following the decisions of the ECtHR 
will become even more relevant if the Constitutional Treaty comes into force and if, in ac-
cordance with it, the EU accedes to the Convention.
34 Familiapress (n 19) para 27.
35 Weatherill (n 4) 188.
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right to obtain information regarding services lawfully provided in anoth-
er Member state just as they derive the right therefrom to distribute such 
information, whether or not for remuneration”.36 Thus, in his opinion, 
the national measure was within the scope of Community law and was in 
principle contrary to Articles 59 and 60 EC (now Arts. 49 and 50 EC). In 
his further analysis, he found that the measure was justifi ed and that the 
justifi cation was in accordance with fundamental rights, specifi cally with 
the freedom of expression and the right to life embodied in the ECHR. 
Criticism of the ERT reasoning still persists. For example, Advocate 
General Jacobs argued extra-judicially that once a restriction is justi-
fi ed under one of the permissible derogations, the question whether the 
restriction infringes a fundamental right is not one of Community law.37 
He suggested that the time had come for the ECJ to make a distinction 
between fundamental rights and some other general principles of Com-
munity law. Under that approach, national derogations from fundamen-
tal freedoms would be subject to the constraints imposed by Community 
law concerning respect for general principles such as non-discrimination 
and proportionality. On the contrary, Community law would not impose 
such constraints on national derogations by requiring them to protect 
fundamental rights.38 
It is easy to ask what the logic and policy would be in distinguish-
ing these different principles of Community law. Of course, it derives 
already from Article 30 EC that the ECJ is required to assess the jus-
tifi cation (contained therein), proposed by a Member State, in the light 
of proportionality and non-discrimination. Therefore, it seems that the 
underlying rationale of the distinction derives from the question whether 
Member States are committed to the protection of a particular principle 
at stake by their own constitutional order or by EC law. So, on the one 
hand, States themselves are trying to achieve fundamental rights protec-
tion, and sources of fundamental rights protection in the Community are 
precisely their common constitutional traditions and the Convention on 
Human Rights to which all Member States are parties (as well as other 
international treaties to which Member States are parties or in which 
they have collaborated).39 On the other hand, Member States’ legal orders 
36 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in SPUC v Grogan (n 18), delivered on 11 June 
1991, para 21.
37 FG Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: the role of the Court of Justice’ (2001) 
26 ELR 331, 336-337.
38 For similar reasoning, see M Avbelj, ‘European Court of Justice and the Question of 
Value Choices - Fundamental human rights as an exception to the freedom of movement of 
goods’ (2004) Jean Monnet Working Paper 06/04, NYU School of Law, 76-78.
39 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- Voratsstelle fur Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1979] ECR 1125, case 4/73 Nold KG v Commission [1974] ECR 491.
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might not, independently of Community law, commit them to guarding 
the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination as understood 
by EC law. Therefore, there is logic in claiming that there is no need for 
the ECJ to intervene in the former case, while it should certainly do so in 
the latter. In my opinion, though, the interaction of Community law and 
national legal orders might create situations which would not be easily 
reviewed by the traditional national systems of fundamental rights pro-
tection (e.g. residual situations, discussed below). Therefore, signifi cant 
effects might come from maintaining the Court’s review of fundamental 
rights in situations that are a consequence of applying or of disapplying 
Community law.
It is not clear whether the EU Charter narrows down the ERT for-
mula or whether it confi rms it. Namely, Article 51 (1) Charter states that 
its provisions “are addressed to institutions and bodies of the Union ... 
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.” 
The question here arises: what does “implementing” Union law mean? In 
one view, this provision, taken on its own, could suggest that the Charter 
does not apply when Member States are “derogating” from Union law. 
That reading would be contrary to the ERT judgement. However, a differ-
ent interpretation can be derived from the explanatory memorandum to 
the Charter. It says that “[a]s regards the Member States, it follows unam-
biguously from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the requirement 
to respect fundamental rights defi ned in a Union context is only binding 
on the Member States when they act in the context of Community law”40 
The phrase “act in the context of Community law” would leave enough 
space for maintaining the ERT formula. It is noteworthy that the Consti-
tutional Treaty incorporated this provision of the Charter in its present 
form, so the questions surrounding the issue remain.41 
Where to go and where not to go beyond ERT?
The case that perhaps went the farthest in developing synergy be-
tween fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is Carpenter.42 Mary 
(later with the married name Carpenter) was a national of the Philippines 
who legally entered the UK, but overstayed her leave to reside in the UK 
and failed to apply for an extension of her stay. When she reappeared 
before British authorities she was married to a British national, Peter 
Carpenter. Their marriage was genuine, but according to UK law Mary 
40 Council of the European Union, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
- Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter’ <http://ue.eu.int/docCenter.
asp?lang=en&cmsid=245> accessed December 2000.
41 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (n 14) art II-111.
42 For the comment of Carpenter see S Acierno, ‘The Carpenter judgment: fundamental 
rights and limits of the Community legal order’ (2003) 28 ELR 398
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Carpenter still had to be deported. Therefore, the Carpenters decided to 
challenge the legality of the deportation. The case was referred to the ECJ 
because Peter Carpenter ran a business established in the UK and pro-
vided a signifi cant proportion of services to recipients in other Member 
States. This cross-frontier provision of services triggered the applicability 
of Community law, so Mr Carpenter was able to avail himself of the right 
guaranteed under Article 4943 EC (especially since the Court had already 
established that this Article could be relied upon against the State in 
which a provider was established44). To the surprise of many commenta-
tors, the Court concluded that the deportation would be contrary to Arti-
cle 49.45 It said that the separation would be detrimental to the family life 
of the Carpenters and “to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exer-
cises a fundamental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective if 
Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in 
his country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse. That free-
dom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from 
exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and 
residence of his spouse”.46 The Court invoked ERT by considering that the 
UK’s public interest in justifying the measure had to be compatible with 
fundamental rights.47 In other words, the Carpenter family was primarily 
protected through the fundamental freedom to provide services, and inci-
dentally also by the right to family life. 
It is true that the reasoning in Carpenter gave outstanding protec-
tion to both the freedom to provide services and to the fundamental right 
at stake, but I will argue that this was done at too great a cost.
Firstly, in respect of the freedom to provide services in Carpenter, 
the Court determined that Article 49 EC was breached by a measure that 
was merely “detrimental” to the conditions under which a fundamental 
freedom was exercised. One should notice that a similarly broad under-
standing of the Treaty has been adopted in some recent cases on the free 
movement of capital48 where the ECJ extended Article 56 to cover meas-
ures deterring or dissuading the exercise of this fundamental freedom. 
In my opinion, these interpretations of the Treaty are too broad. On the 
43 Free movement of services.
44 The ECJ determined in earlier cases that a service provider could call upon art 49 against 
his State of establishment. Case C-384/93 Alpine Investment BV v Minister van Financien 
[1995] ECR I-1141.
45 Carpenter (n 16) para 46.
46 ibid para 39.
47 ibid para 40.
48 Case C-483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, case C-503/99 Commission 
v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809, case C-98/01 Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-
4641.
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one hand, there is no benefi t for market integration in the scrutiny of 
national measures which are so distant from the issue of free movement. 
On the other hand, the consistent application of this reasoning could 
have signifi cant costs and could lower many national standards (such as 
those connected with immigration control which were at stake in Carpen-
ter). Namely, the interpretation would leave hardly any room for national 
regulation, and this is not only worrisome per se, but is even more so in 
situations where there is no Community competence, i.e. where a supra-
national measure could not fi ll the regulatory void. Measures which are 
merely detrimental to the conditions of exercising a fundamental freedom 
are in my opinion exactly the kind of measures which the Krantz test of 
“too uncertain and indirect effect” should exclude from the scope of the 
Treaty.49 It is reassuring in that respect that the Krantz test, originally 
used in the free movement of goods, was subsequently cross-applied to 
cases involving other fundamental freedoms.50
Secondly, in respect of fundamental rights protection in Carpenter, 
the decision may seem as a continuation of the Court’s efforts to prove 
its sensitivity to human rights protection. One can further speculate that 
the ECJ achieved a higher standard of protection than would have been 
granted to the Carpenter family by the ECtHR.51 In any case, regardless 
49 Case C-69/88 H Krantz GmbH & Co. v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands 
State [1990] ECR I-583.
50 For example in cases C-418/93 Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v Sindaco del Commune di Er-
busco etc. [1996] ECR I-2975 and C-190/98 Volker Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH 
[2000] ECR I-493.
51 We can only speculate, but it is possible that the ECtHR would have found the measure to 
be justifi ed. Had the Carpenter case come before the ECtHR, the disputed national measure 
could have been challenged on the grounds of breach of the right to family life (art 8 ECHR). 
However, that right can be limited in the general interest (art 8(2)) under three conditions 
- if the limitation is in accordance with the law, if it pursues one of the legitimate aims listed 
in the Article (national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others) and if it is necessary in a democratic society. The 
situation with the fi rst condition is clear - the measure at stake was in accordance with 
the law. Concerning the second condition, it seems that the UK’s interest in preventing il-
legal immigration could well be a part of several legitimate aims listed in art 8(2). Finally, 
the third condition in fact calls for a proportionality test, and it is possible that the ECtHR 
would have found it to be met since the deportation of Mrs. Carpenter would not have been 
permanent and she could have reapplied to enter the UK. In any case, the comparative 
advantage of human rights protection by the ECJ in the Carpenter case is that the case 
could reach the ECJ regardless of whether all national legal remedies had been exhausted 
or not. The ECtHR has not had a case resembling Carpenter, but there have been several 
cases where deportations were challenged on the basis of article 8 ECHR, and the ECtHR 
found the measures to be justifi ed under art 8(2). See, for example, Boujilifa v France, (App 
no 25404/94) (1997) ECHR 1997-VI; Bouchelkia v France (App no 23078/93) (1997) ECHR 
1997-I. In Chahal v the United Kingdom (App no 22414/93) (1996) ECHR 1996-V, the EC-
tHR held that it was unnecessary to consider the applicants’ complaint under article 8 of 
the Convention since it had already found a breach of other rights protected by the ECHR.
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of what we might think the outcome of the case should be, the question 
raised is who should have the fi nal authority in this matter - the UK, 
the ECtHR or the ECJ? The ECJ said in SPUC v. Grogan that it had no 
such jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of national legislation with 
the fundamental rights where national legislation is outside the scope of 
Community law.52 In my opinion, the measure in Carpenter should have 
been considered as lying outside the scope of Community law because it 
had “too uncertain and indirect effect” on free movement. Consequently, 
the Court should not have assessed the measure in the light of funda-
mental rights.
 There have been good attempts to explain this on the basis of Union 
citizenship by saying that this concept might give the ECJ the legitimacy 
to protect an “individual from disproportionate regulations imposed by 
Member States regardless of an effect, even only potential, on the exercise 
of intra-Community economic activity”.53 If that is the case, then it is odd 
that only citizens exercising a cross-border fundamental freedom enjoy 
the ECJ’s protection. However, even if somehow all citizens would gain 
the same protection (e.g. by extending the principle of non-discrimina-
tion) the question is whether the ECJ should scrutinise measures which 
are so remotely connected to the internal market.
To conclude the analysis of Carpenter, the Court’s reasoning broad-
ened the scope of both the fundamental freedom and of the fundamental 
right at stake and led to a happy end in the concrete case. However, I do 
not regard this synergy of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms 
to be a positive one. By bringing the situation which was so remotely 
connected to Community law within its scope, and by subjecting the is-
sue to the ECJ’s scrutiny, the case law went beyond and even against 
the interests of market integration. Firstly, the approach in Carpenter is 
not sensitive enough to national choices in protecting other legitimate 
interests (in this case, the UK’s control of immigration). Striking down 
national measures in areas where there is no Community competence 
to achieve their aim could render the whole EC system unsustainable. 
Secondly, further application of this approach would clearly increase the 
workload of the ECJ so the Court would have to redirect its resources 
towards solving issues only remotely connected with European law. For 
all these reasons, the Carpenter approach could threaten the legitimacy 
of the Community’s legal system.
As I have pointed out, one of the implications of Carpenter is that 
it blurred the distinction between on the one hand national measures 
52 SPUC v Grogan (n 18) para 31.
53 E Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non-)Economic European Consti-
tution’ (2004) 41 Rev 743, 768.
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within the scope of Community law whose compatibility with fundamen-
tal rights the ECJ should assess (ERT-type measures), and on the oth-
er hand national measures lying outside the scope of Community law 
for which the Court should not be making that assessment (SPUC-type 
measures). The distinction is blurred because it becomes completely un-
clear where the scope of Community law ends (if anywhere). The Karner 
case clouded this distinction even further.
The contested legislation in Karner prohibited, “irrespective of the 
truthfulness of the information … any reference to the fact that goods 
come from an insolvent estate where, in public announcements or no-
tices intended for a large circle of persons, notice is given of the sale of 
goods which originate from, but no longer constitute part of, the insolvent 
estate”.54 On the one hand, regarding the free movement of goods, the 
Court established that the disputed national provision was not caught by 
Article 28. On the other hand, the ECJ did not even assess the measure’s 
compatibility with the free movement of services because it considered 
that, in the circumstances of the case, since the exercise of that freedom 
was secondary to the exercise of the free movement of goods, that there 
was no need to consider the measure in the light of Article 49.55 However, 
quite surprisingly, the Court still engaged in assessing the compatibility 
of the measure with fundamental rights. It repeated that, according to the 
settled case law, its task was to “give the national court all the guidance 
as to the interpretation necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility 
of that legislation with the fundamental rights” if the measure at hand 
“falls within the fi eld of application of Community law”.56 Unfortunately, 
the Court did not tell us how it was possible for the situation in Karner to 
be in the “fi eld of application of Community law” given its lack of connec-
tion with any of the fundamental freedoms. Namely, a question that goes 
unanswered is what triggers the Court’s review of fundamental rights in 
this case. However, if it is not possible to identify what triggers the review, 
is it then possible that all national measures can be subjected to it? 
It is true that the Court in Karner recognised the State’s discretion, 
emphasised the complex and fl uctuating character of advertising, and 
found the law to be compatible with the freedom of expression. Conse-
quently, one might say that this judgement did not put any additional 
constraints on national regulatory autonomy. However, it is my opinion 
that the judgement is not only fl awed from the perspectives of clarity, co-
herence of the law, and methodology, but also because it places the Court 
54 Karner (n 17) para 17.
55 ibid paras 43, 45-47. For a comment of Karner, see J Stuyck, ‘Case C-71/02, Herbert 
Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. TroostwijkGmbH, Judgment of the Fifth Chamber of 
25 March 2004’ (2004) 41 CMLRev 1683.
56 Karner (n 17) para 49.
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in the inappropriate role of reviewing compliance with the fundamental 
rights of measures not connected with Community law. This is not in the 
best interest of the Union.
This criticism of the Court’s approach in Carpenter and Karner does 
not mean that there are no other situations in which I would fi nd it use-
ful to further develop synergies of fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms. An example of a useful development can be found in the recent 
opinion in Carbonati Apuani where Advocate General Maduro argued for 
an extension of the ERT principle to “residual situations” when these fall 
within the scope of Community law.57 Namely, it is well known that Com-
munity law does not apply to internal situations, and that States are al-
lowed to discriminate against their own products and nationals (reverse 
discrimination).58 However, Maduro suggests that in internal situations 
where discrimination is created solely as a consequence of the interaction 
of Community law and national law, i.e. where discrimination is the re-
sult of applying Community law, the remaining national measure should 
also be interpreted in the light of the general principles of Community 
law, especially fundamental rights.59 
Although the case concerned a pecuniary restriction on the free 
movement of goods, the opinion of the Advocate General is relevant to 
understand the connections between fundamental freedoms and funda-
mental rights in general. The question was raised “on the compatibility 
with Community law of a tax collected on goods transported out of”60 an 
Italian municipality, and which was “levied in the same way on goods ex-
ported” 61 to other parts of Italy as those exported to other Member States. 
According to the classical solution, a tax “collected on the occasion of 
crossing of the frontier, even an internal frontier … is capable of consti-
tuting a charge having equivalent effect to a customs duty”.62 Maduro 
considers this to be unsatisfactory. 
The standpoint of the Advocate General is that even in respect of the 
tax imposed on goods which remained in Italy, the situation is not com-
pletely outside the scope of Community law.63 The interaction of Com-
munity law on the free movement of goods and of State law would create 
discrimination since national legislation would have to be disapplied in 
57 Opinion of Advocate General MP Maduro in C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani Srl v Comune di 
Carrara [2004] ECR I-8027, delivered on 6 May 2004, para 65.
58 See, for example, C-448/98 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] 
ECR I-10663 
59 Opinion of Advocate General M. P. Maduro in Carbonati Apunani (n 57) para 65.
60 ibid para 2.
61 ibid para 2.
62 ibid para 3.
63 ibid para 60.
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so far as it affects Community trade. This would mean that “products 
covered by that legislation [would] be subject to different systems” “de-
pending on their destination”.64 Maduro recognises that for a measure to 
fall within the scope of Community law it is not suffi cient that a situation 
arises from the application of that law, but rather that “[i]t must also be 
demonstrated that it infringes one of the specifi c objectives of the Trea-
ty”.65 He argues that the Treaty objectives have been extended, and that 
one of the aims of the Treaty is that no discrimination should arise from 
the application of Community law.66 Consequently, the situation at stake 
lies within the scope of Community law67 and should be “interpreted in 
the light of the general principles of law and in particular of fundamen-
tal rights”68 as well as in the light of the principle of non-discrimination 
which should have a scope and existence independent of the rules on free 
movement.69
It is diffi cult to draw the line in respect of guarding fundamental 
freedoms and fundamental rights, but it is necessary to keep in mind 
that the ECJ is neither a court of human rights nor a national consti-
tutional court and that it has no independent jurisdiction to decide on 
human rights violations, as was recently confi rmed in Vajnai Attila.70 The 
64 ibid para 61.
65 ibid para 63.
66 ibid para 63.
67 ibid para 64.
68 ibid para 65.
69 ibid paras 67, 68. It is worth noting that the ECJ approached the case differently. It con-
sidered that article 23 EC must be read in conjunction with article 14(2) EC which defi nes 
the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” and does not draw any distinction between 
inter-State frontiers and frontiers within a State. It also repeated that “a charge imposed 
when goods cross a territorial boundary within a Member State constitutes a charge hav-
ing effect equivalent to a customs duty”. The tax at stake was found to be a “charge having 
effect equivalent to a customs duty on exports within the meaning of Article 23 EC, despite 
the fact that it is imposed also on goods the fi nal destination of which is within the Member 
State concerned”. Carbonati Apunani (n 57) paras 23-26, 44.
70 In Vajnai Attila (the Red Star case), a Hungarian court asked whether a provision of Hun-
garian law “which provides that a person who uses or displays, in public, the symbol con-
sisting of a fi ve-pointed red star commits - where the conduct does not amount to a more 
serious criminal offence - a minor offence” is “compatible with the fundamental Commu-
nity-law principle of non-discrimination? Do Article 6 TEU, according to which the Union is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, Directive 2000/43/EC, which also refers to fundamental freedoms, and Articles 
10, 11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, allow a person who wishes to ex-
press his political convictions through a symbol representing them to do so in any Member 
State?” (Reference in [2004] OJ C262, 15) The Court held that “Mr Vajnai’s situation is not 
connected in any way with any of the situations contemplated by the provisions of the trea-
ties and the Hungarian provisions applied in the main proceedings are outside the scope of 
Community law”, so that the ECJ has no jurisdiction to provide the national court with “the 
guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility of those pro-
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lack of jurisdiction should not be circumvented by broadening the scope 
of market freedoms so that they would bring almost all situations within 
the realm of Community law and that the Court could adjudicate on hu-
man rights protection. However, the analysis shows that there are still in-
stances in which it would be legitimate for the Court to extend its review 
of fundamental rights protection. 
III. Confl ict of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms
Preliminary remarks - possible approaches
In cases involving a confl ict between fundamental rights and fun-
damental freedoms, the Court has had many possibilities for weighing 
these interests. The fi rst option would be to consider fundamental rights 
protection as part of the justifi cations provided for in Article 30 EC, i.e. to 
treat it as included in the concept of either public morality, public policy, 
or as an unwritten public interest ground.71 The second option would be 
to understand fundamental rights as a mandatory requirement. However, 
the problem with this solution would be that, as the law stands, funda-
mental rights could not be used to justify discriminatory state measures. 
To my mind, this would be wrong because human rights are such an im-
portant interest recognised both by the Community and the States that 
they should be able to present a legitimate justifi cation even for measures 
discriminating against imported goods. In other words, if the protection 
of these rights necessitates the adoption of a national measure discrimi-
nating against imports, the measure should not be considered to breach 
the EC Treaty. Subsequently, the second option should be rejected - fun-
damental rights should not fall within the category of mandatory require-
ments, at least not until the Court changes its approach towards manda-
tory requirements. The third option is to consider fundamental rights as 
a separate type of justifi cation based on the idea that the protection of 
these rights is a part of Community law, so when States restrict the free 
movement of goods in order to protect fundamental rights, they are in 
fact implementing Community law and not derogating from it.72 
It has been argued that establishing a clear hierarchy between fun-
damental rights and fundamental freedoms might become crucial.73 
visions with the fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures”. Case C-328/04 
Criminal proceedings against Attila Vajnai [2005] ECR I-8577 paras 12-14.
71 Morijn (n 5) p 39.
72 For an analysis of the difference between derogation and implementation of Community 
law in connection to human rights, see Morijn (n 5) pp 31-33.
73 C. Brown, ‘Case note - Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte 
und Pfl anzüge v. Austria, Judgement of 12 June 2003, Full Court’ (2003) 40 CMLRev1499, 
1507-1508.
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While I recognise that this is an important methodological step which 
might also be helpful for national and Community authorities, it is also 
my impression that the tensions concerning this issue are overestimated. 
It has been shown that there are two options in dealing with confl icts of 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms.74 Under the fi rst option, 
free movement is the principal rule and those wishing to restrict it in 
order to protect a fundamental right have to justify the restriction.75 The 
second option is the opposite - fundamental rights are the principal rule 
and their limitations aimed at free movement have to be justifi ed.76 
The choice between these alternatives could have two noteworthy im-
plications, but these would only occasionally become relevant. One impli-
cation derives from the fact that each of the two alternatives imposes the 
burden of proof on a different party, in turn tilting the balance between 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in distinct directions.77 
Under the standard approach of the ECJ where fundamental freedoms 
are the principal rule, the balance would be tilted in their favour and to 
the disadvantage of fundamental rights. Bearing in mind that the ECtHR 
has the opposite approach, the possibility of these courts reaching dif-
ferent solutions in the same case is slightly increased. However, the dif-
ference in the burden of proof only becomes crucial when equally strong 
arguments and evidence exist on both sides. This fact mitigates the tilt 
in the balance between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, 
as well as the possibility of divergence in the ECJ’s and the ECtHR’s ju-
risprudence. The other implication of choosing the principal rule is that 
a measure restricting free movement which was adopted for reasons of 
human rights protection would be considered to constitute a “prima facie 
breach” of Community law. I understand the arguments that this lan-
guage “suggests that, even if the restriction is ultimately justifi ed, it re-
mains something which is at its heart ‘wrong’, but tolerated”.78 However, 
in my opinion, this is simply a matter of standard legal terminology and 
the result of an absence of a more appropriate expression. There does not 
have to be anything “wrong” at the heart of the measure, and we can see 
this not only in cases concerning fundamental rights, but also in all cases 
where an Article 30 derogation or a mandatory requirement is used. If a 
trade restrictive measure is justifi ed on the basis, for example, of public 
health or environmental protection, there should be no feeling that there 
is a “wrong” inherent in this measure.
74 See ibid 1507-1508 and G Gonzales, ‘EC Fundamental Freedoms v. Human Rights in 
the Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger v. Austria [2003] ECR I-5659’ (2004) 31(3) Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 219, 226.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
77 Brown (n 73) p 1508.
78 ibid.
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The following analysis of the case law will show that the ECJ has not 
yet adopted a clear approach to weighing fundamental rights and funda-
mental freedoms, and it does not seem willing to balance these categories 
as such. Rather, the Court seems to be adopting a case-by-case approach 
where the balancing depends on the circumstances of the case. This ap-
proach leaves room for national choices in human rights protection, but 
also places a great deal of responsibility on national courts, and is likely 
to cause many new references to the ECJ. 
Case law analysis
More intensive debate on the possible confl icts between fundamen-
tal freedoms and fundamental rights was brought about by the dispute 
known as the Spanish Strawberries case.79 French farmers were protest-
ing against agricultural products from other Member States, especially 
Spanish strawberries, and private individuals committed a series of vio-
lent acts against importers. The Commission brought an action against 
France, and the Court found that Article 28 “also applies where a Mem-
ber State abstains from adopting the measures required in order to deal 
with obstacles to the free movement of goods which are not caused by 
the State”.80 This was the fi rst time that an omission of a State fell foul 
of Article 28, and it raised many questions regarding the extent to which 
States might be responsible for inaction when private persons create ob-
stacles to trade. Although no one in this case argued that French farmers 
were exercising a fundamental right, an important question arose about 
whether a State could be found in violation of Article 28 in situations 
where private persons created obstacles to the free movement of goods by 
exercising their fundamental right, such as the right to strike.
The issue was addressed in Regulation 2679/9881 which was adopt-
ed in the aftermath of Spanish Strawberries. The Regulation reiterates 
that an obstacle to the free movement of goods can involve either the 
action or inaction of a State82 and it emphasises that “Member States 
should, on the one hand, abstain from adopting measures or engaging in 
conduct liable to constitute an obstacle to trade and, on the other hand, 
take all necessary and proportionate measures with a view of facilitating 
free movement of goods in their territory”,83 but it also explicitly provides 
79 C-265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959.
80 ibid para 30.
81 Council Regulation (EC) 2679/98 of 7 December 1998 on the functioning of the internal 
market in relation to the free movement of goods among Member States [1998] OJ L337.
82 Article 1 Regulation (EC) 2679/98.
83 Preamble Regulation (EC) 2679/98.
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that “such measures must not affect the exercise of fundamental rights, 
including the freedom to strike”.84
The fi rst case where fundamental freedoms explicitly came into con-
fl ict with the protection of fundamental rights in a way that a Member 
State invoked the necessity of protecting the latter in order to justify a 
restriction on the former was Schmidberger.85 Fundamental rights were 
here directly invoked to justify a restriction on the free movement of 
goods, and not merely to assess the validity of another justifi cation (ei-
ther from Article 30 or a mandatory requirement) as was the case in ERT 
and Familiapress.86
The Schmidberger case arose when Austrian authorities allowed an 
association for the protection of the biosphere in the Alpine region87 to 
demonstrate on the Brenner motorway, during which time the motorway 
had to be closed to traffi c. This motorway was the “main, if not the only, 
intra-Community route”88 in the Alpine region “available for heavy goods 
vehicles without a considerable detour”89 so, due to the demonstration, 
84 Preamble Regulation (EC) 2679/98, and similarly in art 2 Regulation (EC) 2679/98.
85 There was an earlier case of potential confl ict between national rules aimed at human 
rights protection on the one hand and free movement rules on the other hand, but the latter 
concerned a Regulation and not EC Treaty provisions. The Court in Adidas found that Reg-
ulation 3295/94 (laying down measures to prohibit the release for free circulation, export, 
re-export or entry for a suspensive procedure of counterfeit and pirated goods) precluded 
national law under which the identity of the declarants or consignees of imported goods 
which the trademark owner found to be counterfeit might not be disclosed to him. Advocate 
General Cosmas discussed whether the provisions of the Regulation on disclosing the men-
tioned information to the trademark holder was compatible “with the fundamental rules 
and general principles of Community law. In particular... the extent to which the disclosure 
of the name and address of the declarant and the consignee of goods whose authenticity has 
been checked is consistent with the fundamental rules on the protection of private life and 
free development of the personality” (para 34). After conducting an analysis of conditions 
for restricting these fundamental rights, Cosmas concluded that “the Community legislator 
has properly balanced the existing interests, on the one hand the interests of the declarant 
and the consignee of goods and on the other the interests of the trade-mark holder and the 
market in general” (para 41). The question is what would have happened if the State was 
not satisfi ed with the level of fundamental rights protection achieved by the Regulation and 
if it had insisted upon its own, higher level of protection of the rights at stake. These kinds 
of questions will be discussed further in the analysis of the Schmidberger and Omega cases. 
Case C-223/98 Adidas AG [1999] ECR I-7081, Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas, in C-
223/98 Adidas AG, delivered on 10 June 1998.
86 For a comparison of the Schmidberger case with earlier case law, see F Ronkes Agerbeek, 
‘Freedom of Expression and Free Movement in the Brenner Corridor: The Schmidberger 
Case’ (2004) 29(2) ELR 255, 262-263; also A Biondi, ‘Free Trade, A Mountain Road and the 
Right to Protest: European Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Individual Rights’, (2004) 
1 EHRLR 51, 55-58.
87 Schmidberger (n 30) para 10.
88 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Schmidberger (n 30), delivered on 11 July 2002, 
para 2.
89 ibid.
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heavy goods vehicles were immobilised for more than 30 hours. Schmid-
berger, a transport company whose vehicles were prevented from using 
the motorway during the demonstration, brought an action for damages 
against Austria. The question that the ECJ had to answer was whether 
in these circumstances the closing of the Brenner motorway for 30 hours 
amounted to a restriction of the free movement of goods and, if so, wheth-
er the restriction was justifi ed.
The Court had no diffi culty in establishing that the conduct of the 
Austrian authorities was a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction on the free movement of goods because it was settled in the 
case law that, fi rstly, rules on the free movement of goods apply not only 
to imports and exports, but also to transit, and, secondly, that a state 
omission can also be contrary to Article 28 EC.90 The ECJ said that this 
measure was, in principle, incompatible with Articles 28 and 29, unless 
the failure to ban a demonstration was objectively justifi ed.91 
Turning to the analysis of the justifi cation, I explained above that 
there are at least three possibilities of weighing fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms. However, the Court in Schmidberger did not ex-
plicitly select one of them, but merely said that “since both the Commu-
nity and its Member States are required to respect fundamental rights, 
the protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, 
justifi es a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even 
under a fundamental freedom ... such as the free movement of goods”.92 
Unfortunately, the Court did not tell us what this “legitimate interest” 
means and what type of justifi cation is at stake. Instead, it continued 
explaining how fundamental rights protection needs to be reconciled with 
fundamental freedoms and it restated that the free movement of goods 
can be subject to a restriction “for the reasons laid down in Article 36 ... 
or for overriding requirements relating to public interest, in accordance 
with the Court’s consistent case-law since the judgement in ... Cassis de 
Dijon”.93 This paragraph might suggest that the Court in Schmidberger is 
applying either the fi rst or the second above-mentioned option, but it is 
certainly not clear which one. 
Academic writing reveals different and contradictory understandings 
of the way in which the ECJ used fundamental rights as a justifi cation 
in Schmidberger. My stated opinion approximates that of C. Brown who 
argues that in Schmidberger “there is no attempt to pigeonhole a justifi -
cation based on need to respect human rights into one of the justifi catory 
90 Commission v France (n 79).
91 Schmidberger (n 30) para 64.
92 ibid para 74.
93 ibid para 78.
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categories” and that it “could therefore be said that the ECJ has in fact 
invoked (perhaps created) a ‘fl oating’ justifi cation, albeit one which is 
nevertheless subject to the familiar proportionality test”.94
Catherine Barnard considers that fundamental rights protection 
constitutes a mandatory requirement.95 She argues that the Court in 
Schmidberger did not see fundamental rights as a public policy deroga-
tion, but rather as a “free-standing justifi cation or public interest require-
ment”.96 Under this conception, fundamental rights still remain distinct 
from other mandatory requirements because they are also a general prin-
ciple of Community law, and other mandatory requirements have to be 
assessed in their light (Familiapress).97 The problem with this solution is 
that the classical approach of the ECJ does not accept the use of manda-
tory requirements for the justifi cation of distinctly applicable measures. 
Under that approach, fundamental rights as a mandatory requirement 
could only serve as a justifi cation of indistinctly applicable restrictions 
on free movement. Nevertheless, this might not be a problem since there 
have already been many cases where the Court blurred the distinction 
between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures and between ex-
press Article 30 derogations and mandatory requirements.98 
However, scholars have also argued that the justifi cation of the meas-
ure in Schmidberger was neither an Article 30 derogation nor a manda-
tory requirement,99 but rather that the Court was deciding on the hier-
archy of fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, giving primacy 
to the latter.100 I agree that in this particular case the ECJ supported a 
restriction on the free movement of goods on grounds of protection of the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly. However, in my view 
it does not follow from this that freedom of expression and freedom of as-
sembly have been given any general primacy over the free movement of 
goods. The ECJ emphasised that all of these categories can be restricted 
and that “the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance 
was struck between those interests”.101 A fortiori we cannot deduce from 
94 Brown (n 73) p 1504.




98 Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431 (Walloon Waste), C-67/97 Bluhme 
[1998] ECR I-8033. Barnard (n 95) 117-118.
99 Gonzales (n 74) 223.
100 ibid 226.
101 Schmidberger (n 30) para 81.
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Schmidberger that the ECJ established a clear hierarchy between funda-
mental rights and fundamental freedoms.102
It seems to me that the Court is not inclined to set a fi rm rule for 
weighing fundamental rights against fundamental freedoms, but rather 
that it wants to leave more space for States and for itself to decide these 
issues on a case-by-case basis. In that respect, an important part of the 
analysis appears in the Court’s scrutiny of proportionality where it is 
emphasised that both the free movement of goods and the fundamental 
rights at stake, and the freedom of expression and the freedom of assem-
bly can be limited,103 and that the weighing of the interests involved must 
be done with regard to all the circumstances of the case, and particularly 
with regard to the fact that the competent authorities enjoy wide discre-
tion in that area.104 
To conclude the analysis of Schmidberger, the ECJ did not adopt a 
crystal clear rule on the relationship between fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms which could provide a simple answer in all future 
cases where they come into confl ict. Rather, as Advocate General Stix-
Hackl points out, it seems that “[t]he need to reconcile the requirements 
of the protection of fundamental rights cannot ... mean weighing up fun-
damental freedoms against fundamental rights per se”.105 “[T]he neces-
sary weighing up of the interests involved ultimately takes place in the 
context of the actual circumstances in which the particular fundamental 
rights are restricted.”106 This case-by-case approach undoubtedly puts a 
great deal of responsibility in the hands of national courts, and it is prob-
able that it will cause many new references to the ECJ.107
The Court was given another opportunity to explain the relationship 
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in Omega.108 The 
Omega company operated a laserdrome, and games that were played on 
this installation included shooting “sensory tags placed on jackets worn 
by players” with laser beams, and recording the number of shots.109 Ger-
102 Contrary to Gonzales (n 74) 226.
103 Schmidberger (n 30) para 78-80. In general, I believe that there are areas in which the 
ECJ is modifying the standard of review over measures caught by Article 28 and making 
the scrutiny less strict, but this has implications which go beyond the subject matter of this 
paper and will not be discussed here.
104 ibid paras 81, 82.
105 Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Omega (n 6) para 53.
106 ibid para 53.
107 Brown (n 73) 1510.
108 For a comment on Omega, see T Ackermann, ‘Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und 
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Judgment 
of the Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 14 October 2004, nyr’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 1107.
109 Omega (n 31) para 5.
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man authorities considered this game to imitate killing people and issued 
an order forbidding Omega to facilitate or allow the playing of this game 
in its establishment. The question that reached the ECJ was whether the 
prohibition at stake was incompatible with the freedom to provide serv-
ices and the free movement of goods. As the issue of the free movement 
of goods (i.e. that of the laserdrome equipment) in this case was merely 
secondary and attached to the freedom to provide services, the Court ex-
amined the issue only regarding services and found that the provision of 
services was affected.110
In justifying the measure, German authorities called upon the pro-
tection of human dignity guaranteed by the German Constitution and 
upon public policy. It is worth pointing out that human dignity within 
the German constitution is not merely a constitutional principle, but 
rather an independent fundamental right. In contrast, human dignity 
in international documents and in the national legal systems of other 
Member States “seems to appear ... as a general article of faith or ... as 
a fundamental evaluation or constitutional principle, rather than as an 
independent justiciable rule of law”.111 The national court inquired in that 
respect whether “a common legal conception in all Member States is a 
precondition” for restricting a fundamental freedom.
While the Court held that it is not necessary to have a common legal 
conception for justifying a national restriction on the freedom to provide 
services, it still did not treat human dignity as a separate human right. 
It held that since both fundamental rights and human dignity are a part 
of the general principles of Community law, it was “immaterial ... that ... 
in Germany ... the principle of respect for human dignity has a particu-
lar status as an independent fundamental right”.112 Therefore, the Court 
included human dignity into the concept of public policy, which was ex-
pressly provided for by Article 46 EC as a permissible derogation from the 
freedom to provide services, and it discussed these issues jointly.
The approach in Omega is not without problems in respect of weigh-
ing national values against fundamental freedoms. Firstly, it is still im-
possible to conclude whether the protection of all human rights falls 
within the public policy category. Namely, it is possible that the ECJ 
would treat the issue differently if human dignity was recognised as a 
fundamental right by the common constitutional traditions of Member 
States, since the concept would then enjoy the status of a fundamental 
right within Community law. This is also suggested in the opinion of Ad-
vocate General Stix-Hackl who points out an important methodological 
110 This was in accordance with the Court’s previous case law. Omega (n 31) paras 25-27.
111 Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Omega (n 6) para 84.
112 Omega (n 31) para 34.
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difference between, on the one hand, a fundamental right which is spe-
cifi c for one Member State, and, on the other hand, fundamental rights 
common to all Member States. The latter category, fundamental rights 
recognised by the common constitutional traditions of Member States, is 
a part of the Community system of fundamental rights protection. In that 
case, “it would no longer be necessary to examine whether the national 
measure is to be considered a justifi ed, because permissible, exception 
to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, but, according to 
the Schmidberger judgement, how the requirements of the protection of 
fundamental rights in the Community can be reconciled with those aris-
ing from a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty”.113 According 
to the opinion of Stix-Hackl, human dignity had to be evaluated as part 
of public policy because the concept is of an inchoate nature, so it was 
impossible for the Court to “equate the substance of the guarantee of hu-
man dignity under the German Basic Law with that of the guarantee of 
human dignity as recognised by the Community”.114 Consequently, while 
it is not clear from the judgement in Omega, the opinion of the Advocate 
General in the case suggests that other fundamental rights, recognised 
by the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, would 
not be considered as part of the public policy exception, but rather as an 
independent justifi cation for the restriction of fundamental freedoms.
The judgement in Omega appears to me as a continuance of the long-
lasting tensions between the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, regarding the issue about who has compe-
tence to enable a balance to be ultimately struck between a fundamental 
right and a fundamental freedom.115 The position of the ECJ is that for the 
reasons of uniformity and effi cacy of Community law, the validity of EC 
measures cannot be judged with recourse to the legal rules or concepts 
of national law, but only in the light of Community law.116 Therefore, a 
state cannot derogate from the fundamental freedoms by simply calling 
upon its constitutional rights and principles, such as human dignity. In 
contrast, national constitutional courts would no longer observe Com-
munity law and the judgements of the ECJ if those were not respectful of 
national constitutions. The German Constitutional Court made this clear 
in 1974 in its famous judgement known as Solange I where it held that in 
the hypothetical case of a confl ict between Community law and the Ger-
113 Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Omega (n 6) para 72.
114 ibid paras 92-93.
115 For a discussion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in connection to the Omega case, see CT 
Smith and T Fetzer, ‘The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of Justice’s Authority: 
Economic Freedom versus Human Dignity’ (2004) 10 Columbia Journal of European Law 
445.
116 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n 39) para 3.
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man constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, the constitutional 
guarantees would prevail for as long as the confl ict remained unresolved 
by the Community.117 In the years following Solange I, the EC developed 
its own system of fundamental rights protection which the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht considered satisfactory. Consequently, in 1986, in Solange 
II, it stated that “so long as the European Communities, and in particular 
the case law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective protec-
tion of fundamental rights ... which is to be regarded as substantially 
similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally 
by the Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essen-
tial content of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court ... 
will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental 
rights contained in the Constitution”.118 Hence, it was always in the best 
interest of the ECJ and the Community as a whole for the Court to pro-
vide an “effective” and “substantially similar” protection of fundamental 
rights contained in the German constitution. 
So, to return to the facts of Omega, while it was not necessary for the 
ECJ to treat human dignity as an independent human right, it was still 
necessary to protect it “effectively” and “substantially similarly” to the 
way it was protected by the German Constitution. The ECJ managed to 
provide this level of protection by stating that human dignity is a general 
principle of law, that in the given circumstances its protection was a part 
of public policy,119 and, furthermore, the Court left enough discretion to 
the national authorities so that they could prohibit the service at stake as 
contrary to human dignity.
To conclude the analysis of Schmidberger and Omega, these cases 
demonstrate how committed the EU is to fundamental rights protection. 
117 (1974) 2 CMLR 540, 549-50. “Vorläufi g entsteht also in dem unterstellten Fall einer Kol-
lision von Gemeinschaftsrecht mit einem Teil des nationalen Verfassungsrechts, näherhin 
der grundgesetzlichen Grundrechtsgarantien, die Frage, welches Recht vorgeht, das andere 
also verdrängt. In diesem Normenkonfl ikt setzt sich die Grundrechtsgarantie des Grund-
gesetzes durch, solange nicht entsprechend dem Vertragsmechanismus die zuständigen 
Organe der Gemeinschaft den Normenkonfl ikt behoben haben.”, BVerfGE 37, 271 - Solange 
I, decision of 29 May 1974 <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv037271.html>.
118 (1987) 3 CMLR 225, 265. “Solange die Europäischen Gemeinschaften, insbesondere 
die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Gemeinschaften einen wirksamen Schutz der 
Grundrechte gegenüber der Hoheitsgewalt der Gemeinschaften generell gewährleisten, der 
dem vom Grundgesetz als unabdingbar gebotenen Grundrechtsschutz im wesentlichen 
gleichzuachten ist, zumal den Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte generell verbürgt, wird das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht seine Gerichtsbarkeit über die Anwendbarkeit von abgeleitetem 
Gemeinschaftsrecht, das als Rechtsgrundlage für ein Verhalten deutscher Gerichte oder 
Behörden im Hoheitsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Anspruch genommen 
wird, nicht mehr ausüben und dieses Recht mithin nicht mehr am Maßstab der Grund-
rechte des Grundgesetzes überprüfen” BVerfGE 73, 339 - Solange II, decision of 22 October 
1986, <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv073339.html>.
119 Omega (n 31) paras 34 and 32.
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They also shed new light on the reasoning introduced in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaf and Nold where the Court held that this protection 
was inspired by the common constitutional traditions of Member States120 
and by “international treaties for the protection of human rights on which 
the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories”.121 
Schmidberger and Omega illustrate how broad the implications of this 
reasoning are, since fundamental rights can be invoked even for limiting 
the application of Treaty rules on fundamental market freedoms.
IV. Conclusion
The development of the Community system of fundamental rights 
was primarily led by the ECJ, and we can assume that this was a neces-
sary corollary of the fact that the European legal order had started pre-
senting new restraints on national sovereignty, especially through direct 
effect and supremacy. Member States would not have been willing to ac-
cept such characteristics of the Community legal system if that system 
was not at least bound by the protection of fundamental rights. Today, 
the Union has a complex system of fundamental rights and, on the one 
hand, there are instances where the ECJ can review whether a Member 
State is observing those rights and, on the other hand, situations exist 
where Community law permits States to derogate even from fundamental 
freedoms in order to protect fundamental rights. Concerning the interac-
tion of fundamental rights with fundamental market freedoms, the Court 
for a long time had to decide only cases where these two categories went 
hand in hand, but recently we have seen cases where they have been 
in confl ict. It is important to notice that in both types of cases the ECJ 
showed deference to the protection of fundamental rights, but the prob-
lem is that it seemed to lack concern for other interests that national 
regulators seek to protect. 
Regarding the fi rst type of cases where fundamental rights and fun-
damental freedoms worked to each other’s advantage, the main question 
is how to leave the States enough leeway for the protection of the other 
interests involved (e.g. control over immigration). In that respect, it must 
be noticed that the limits of the Treaty provisions on free movement (such 
as those introduced in the sphere of goods by the Keck122 and Krantz line 
of case law) are relevant not only because they generally allow States 
more regulatory autonomy, but also because they limit the possibility of 
the ECJ to guard fundamental rights. In other words, the scope of the 
120 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n 39) para 4.
121 Nold (n 39) para13.
122 Joined cases C-267/91 & C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard 
[1993] ECR I-6097.
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Treaty articles on fundamental freedoms “partly determines the scope of 
fundamental rights protection given by the ECJ against Member States’ 
action”,123 so, for example, limiting the scope of Article 28 EC reduces 
“the number and type of national measures that can be reviewed under 
the fundamental rights affi rmed by the Court of Justice”.124 As I have 
argued elsewhere,125 this scope of Treaty provisions on free movement 
should be taken seriously, and it should not be extended merely to bring 
a situation involving human rights into the fi eld of application of Com-
munity law. However, the Carpenter case raises concerns that the reality 
might be quite the opposite and under that scenario the States would be 
left with very little space for national regulation aimed at the protection 
of other interests. Further application of the reasoning adopted in Car-
penter as well as Karner might result in the lowering of national stand-
ards (for example of immigration control), which would be particularly 
frightening in areas where the Community lacks competence to replace 
national measures. However, this does not mean that there is no more 
space for developing synergies between fundamental rights and funda-
mental freedoms. A good example of where this could be done was dis-
cussed above in connection with the opinion of Advocate General Maduro 
in Carbonati Apuani.
 It is certainly not easy to precisely determine where to draw the line 
in guarding fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, but it should 
be borne in mind that the ECJ is neither a court of human rights nor a 
national constitutional court and that it has no independent jurisdiction 
to decide on human rights violations,126 as was recently confi rmed in 
Vajnai Attila.127 One should not try to circumvent this lack of jurisdiction 
by broadening the scope of market freedoms in order to bring a situation 
within Community law so that the Court could adjudicate on human 
rights protection. “The potential for fundamental rights litigation is enor-
mous under the present case law of the Court in the rules of free move-
ment”,128 but should not be abused. Interpreting Treaty rules on market 
freedoms too broadly could jeopardise the functioning of the entire Com-
munity legal system. It could make the workload of the ECJ unmanage-
123 Maduro (n 32) p 312.
124 ibid 312.
125 T Perišin, ‘Balancing Sovereignty with the Free Movement of Goods in the EU and the 
WTO - Non-Pecuniary Restrictions on Free Movement of Goods’ (2005) 1 Croatian Year-
book of European Law; T Perišin, ‘Admissibility of National Measures in Relation to Free 
Movement in the European Union’ (2003) Journal of the Faculty of Law in Zagreb (Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu)
126 See ERT (n 15), SPUC v Grogan (n 18) and case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für 
Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609.
127 Vajnai Attila (n 70) paras 12-14.
128 Maduro (n 32) 313.
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able, disable necessary national regulation, and threaten the legitimacy 
of the Community’s legal system.
Concerning the second type of cases, where fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms are in confl ict, the analysis demonstrates that the 
ECJ has not adopted a clear test for weighing these interests, and, fur-
thermore, the Court is not engaged in balancing these categories. Rather, 
the Court appears to be adopting a case-by-case approach where balanc-
ing is done with regard to the circumstances of the case. The advantage 
of such a solution is its fl exibility and the possibility of taking into con-
sideration Member States’ specifi cities. The Court is sensitive to national 
regulatory choices, so national authorities are given signifi cant discretion 
in achieving their desired level of human rights protection. The main 
drawback of the current approach is that we do not know in which cat-
egory of justifi cation for trade restrictive measures human rights belong. 
Do they belong to Article 30 derogations, a mandatory requirement, or 
perhaps to a new type of justifi cation? The answer to this question would 
be particularly relevant in cases where human rights are invoked to jus-
tify a discriminatory restriction on the free movement of goods, since 
not all types of justifi cation can be used in such cases. Another problem 
with not having a clear approach on weighing fundamental rights against 
fundamental freedoms is that national courts might hesitate in decid-
ing on these questions, and this might stimulate many new references 
to the ECJ. All this requires a more precise test, but a test which would 
remain fl exible enough not to impair national standards of human rights 
protection. I would certainly recommend making it clear that fundamen-
tal rights are a type of justifi cation for restrictions of market freedoms 
which can be used both for saving distinctly and indistinctly applicable 
measures (whether a special type of justifi cation, a part of Article 30, or 
even a mandatory requirement, provided that the fi eld of application of 
mandatory requirements is extended).
It can easily be imagined that following Schmidberger and Omega 
many new cases could arise in which a fundamental right or a funda-
mental principle would be called upon to justify a derogation from a fun-
damental market freedom. In that respect, it should be noted that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights contains both rights and principles,129 so 
129 It is not entirely clear what the difference between rights and principles is, and which 
concepts fall within which of these two categories. 
The Charter says that principles shall be observed (art 51), and the Working Group of the 
European Convention which analysed the possibility of inserting the Charter into the Con-
stitutional Treaty proposed adding a paragraph into the Constitutional text of the Charter 
saying that principles “may call for implementation through legislative or executive acts; 
accordingly, they become signifi cant for the Courts when such acts are interpreted or re-
viewed” (Final report of the Working Group II “Incorporation of the Charter / accession to 
the ECHR”, CONV 354/02, 22 October 2002, at p 8). In contrast, it seems that rights are 
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it seems that all the categories mentioned in this document could poten-
tially authorise derogations from fundamental market freedoms.130 For 
example, in order to justify the mandatory use of an offi cial language on 
product labels, a State could not only call upon public health and con-
sumer protection if these were applicable, but also on linguistic diversity 
which is guaranteed by Article 22 of the Charter (as well as by Article 151 
EC on cultural diversity).131 It remains to be seen whether this is the path 
that the Court will follow.
justiciable. The text of the Charter which is incorporated in the Constitution is amended 
in this part. The new provision embodied in art II-112 provides that “the provisions of this 
Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts 
taken by institutions, bodies, offi ces and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member 
States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. 
They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling 
on their legality”. 
However, how to determine which concept is a right and which is a principle? One solu-
tion is to analyse the wording of the article in order to determine whether its purpose is 
to impose an obligation upon the Union and the Member States or to grant rights to indi-
viduals. For example, if one looks at article 37 on environmental protection, it is clear that 
it contains a principle. However, with many provisions the situation is more diffi cult. For 
example, equality between men and women is expressed in article 23 as a principle, while 
the case law clearly demonstrates it contains a justiciable right. In contrast, the rights of 
the elderly (article 25) and the rights of persons with disabilities (article 26) are actually 
principles, although the Charter refers to them as rights. 
130 It is true that the Charter is not legally binding and, arguably, the Charter only reaffi rms 
rights that are already recognised in the legal order of the Union. It is written in the Pream-
ble that the “Charter reaffi rms ... the rights as they result ... from the constitutional tradi-
tions and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European 
Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and 
by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities and of the European Court of Human Rights”. For an analysis of the arguments 
in favour of considering that the Charter contains many novelties for fundamental rights 
protection, see T Perišin, ‘Human Rights Protection under the EU Constitution (Zaštita 
ljudskih prava po Ustavu Europske unije)’ (2005) 5 Journal of the Faculty of Law in Zagreb 
(Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu).
131 I am grateful to Stephen Weatherill for pointing this out to me.
